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This contribution describes differences between 10 migrant groups
and natives in their attitudes towards government spending in three
residence countries: Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Pre-
vious research provided evidence that “migrants” as a catch‐all
category of people from different origins are in favor of more
government spending on social welfare. We study to what extent
support for government spending can be explained by self‐interest
explanations of welfare state attitudes as well as by differences in
ideological position. The contribution employs data from the
Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes project, including migrant groups
from similar origins in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. The
study moves beyond the larger migrant groups of Turks and Poles
that received attention in previous research as well, and includes a
greater variety of groups that differ in terms of their skill levels.
The overall finding is that migrants' welfare state spending prefer-
ences are, as in the case of natives, significantly related to socio‐
demographic differences and standard ideology measures of
attitudes to regulation of the economy and family values. However,
even with these standard variables included, spending preferences
differ strongly between migrant groups, residence countries, and
welfare spending domain. A comparison between country of origin
and residence country provisions seems to be a promising path for
further understanding migrant group differences in welfare state
spending attitudes. The study challenges the idea that all migrants
are supportive of extended welfare state arrangements.
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896 LUBBERS ET AL.1 | INTRODUCTION
Research on attitudes about the welfare state has only very recently shown interest in migrants and minority
members. In the United States, there are a sizable amount of studies addressing the role of race and migration status
in explaining welfare state support (Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, 2001; Keely & Tan, 2008; Lind, 2007; Luttmer,
2001). However, in Europe, the migrant perspective has been neglected almost completely. Instead, research favored
interest in the extent to which immigration affects welfare state attitudes among majority populations (e.g., Eger,
2010; Ervasti & Hjerm, 2012; Facchini & Mayda, 2012; Larsen, 2011; Mewes & Mau, 2013; Reeskens & Van
Oorschot, 2013; Svallfors, 2012; Van der Waal, De Koster, & Van Oorschot, 2013; Vandoninck, Meeusen, &
Dejaeghere, 2017). That well‐developed line of research finds that a sizable part of the population perceives immigra-
tion as a burden for welfare states because of the commonly held belief that migrants drain resources unevenly. This
perception of “them” profiting from “us” is found to have affected the vote for the populist radical right (e.g., Ennser‐
Jedenastik, 2017). Additionally, welfare state research has focused on the extent to which first and second generation
migrants and natives differ in participation in entitlement programs (e.g., Borjas & Hilton, 1996), and whether
countries differ in the social rights given to migrants (e.g., Sainsbury, 2006).
A question that remains understudied is how migrants themselves perceive the welfare state. Only a small
minority of the European publications have controlled for migration status (yes/no) or for ethnic origin (e.g., Van
Oorschot, 2006). Through the studies by Reeskens and Van Oorschot (2015) and Kolbe and Crepaz (2016) we have
come to learn more about migrants' attitudes towards the European welfare states. Their findings based on the
European Social Survey (ESS) suggest that migrants largely assimilate to the attitudes of natives, and that their
marginally higher support for state intervention can largely be explained by their more vulnerable socio‐economic
position. This study builds upon these important contributions, but tackles the migrant perspective on the welfare
state in greater detail.
To this aim, we use data from the Migrants' Welfare State Attitudes (MIFARE) project that involved a pri-
mary data collection among 10 migrant groups and natives. Our data allows us to analyze migrants' welfare
state preferences from several perspectives. First of all, we are able to study group differences in attitudes
towards government spending in a much more detailed way than previous studies that looked at migrants as
a catch‐all category of people from different origins. This study not only focuses on the larger, well studied,
migrant groups of Turks and Poles, but includes a greater variety of groups that differ in terms of their motives
for migrating and their skill levels: Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Russian, Romanian, Spanish, British, and American
migrants. The choice for these origin countries ensures strong variance in average economic positions of
migrants in the residence countries, something that migration research, with its focus on the less‐well
integrated migrant groups, often overlooks. Moreover, in much of the previous research employing the ESS
(e.g., Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015), respondents were interviewed only in the host country language. This
is an important limitation because it increases socio‐economic selectivity on those included in the survey. This
selectivity in the groups and individuals included in previous studies is problematic because migrants' socio‐
economic status and, related to this, degree of vulnerability play an important role in explaining their welfare
support. The MIFARE survey alleviates this problem as migrants could also participate in the language of their
country of origin, ensuring that migrants without proficiency in the language of the host country are included
in the sample as well.
Second, migrant groups from similar origins were surveyed in three different receiving countries: Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands. While all three countries are three highly‐developed welfare state regimes (Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands) they show some differences in their integration policies granting migrant access to
welfare state arrangements.
Third and finally, our data enables us to analyze what explains the differences in migrants' attitudes towards
different domains of welfare spending: unemployment, social assistance, state pensions, elderly care, health care,
and childcare.
LUBBERS ET AL. 897Theoretically, this article looks into several explanations for differences between migrant groups and natives in
spending preferences, including self‐interest and ideology approaches (Chung & Meuleman, 2017). In sum, we ques-
tion to what extent support for government spending varies between migrant groups (and natives) and can be
explained by socio‐demographic differences that are related to self‐interest explanations of welfare state attitudes,
such as income and labor market position, as well as by differences in ideological position.2 | THEORIES ON WELFARE ATTITUDES
2.1 | Self‐interest
One of the classical hypotheses in the field posits that support for the welfare state is guided by self‐interest.
The point of departure in this assumption is that support for more government spending for sick, disabled, or unem-
ployed people is stronger among people who are at higher risk themselves of falling into these categories (Andreß &
Heien, 2001; Busemeyer & Neimanns, 2017; Gelissen, 2002; Goerres & Tepe, 2010; Habibov, 2013; Jӕger, 2006;
Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2013, 2015; Rehm, Hacker, & Schlesinger, 2012; Van Oorschot, 2006). People in lower
socio‐economic positions, i.e. people on lower income, with lower levels of education, in more insecure labor market
relations or who are unemployed, as well as people in worse health conditions, are in more vulnerable positions
and therefore more likely to support government intervention from which they have a higher likelihood to profit in
the future.
Previous research often assumed that migrants in general are more likely to be in this category of “at risk” group
(Reeskens & Van Oorschot, 2015). Hence the hypothesis that migrants are more in favor of extended government
spending on welfare due to their self‐interest. However, there needs to be a more careful unpacking of the
concept of “migrant”. In most European countries, immigrant integration and intergroup relations have been
discussed in relation to migration from non‐Western countries and, more recently, from Eastern European
countries (Diehl, Lubbers, Mühlau, & Platt, 2016; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008). However, many European countries
have large shares of immigrant populations from neighboring European Union (EU) member states and other Western
countries as well. Although highly skilled workers exist in each migrant group, migrants from Western countries
tend to be in a better socio‐economic position (Van Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004). Following self‐interest
approaches, immigrants in better socio‐economic positions are likely to be less supportive of additional
government spending on welfare. Since among the Western immigrant groups migrants with higher socio‐economic
positions are better represented, this should explain the variance among migrant groups (and natives) in their
support of welfare state spending. It is therefore highly relevant to distinguish between migrant groups to see
whether differences in their attitudes are, indeed, attributable to variance in self‐interest as this approach predicts.
Following this line of reasoning, one would anticipate that:H1: Differences between migrant groups and natives in support for government spending on welfare
schemes are explained by differences in (economic) self‐interest (a), with stronger self‐interest being
associated with stronger support for government spending (b).2.2 | Ideologies
In the literature on welfare state attitudes, a second theoretical approach to understand variance in preferences is
based on ideology (Chung & Meuleman, 2017). People's general ideologies on state intervention and state responsi-
bilities would affect people's preferences about government spending. Ideological beliefs encompassing a limited
government and more individual responsibility may relate to restrictions of government spending on welfare
(Achterberg, Houtman, & Derks, 2011; Blekesaune, 2013; Emmenegger & Klemmensen, 2013; Feldman &
Steenbergen, 2001; Habibov, 2013). Previous research has highlighted the association between ideological position
898 LUBBERS ET AL.and welfare state attitudes (Chung &Meuleman, 2017), though its causality has not received much discussion (but see
Achterberg et al., 2011). The findings redirect the question from why people vary in their welfare state attitude to why
people vary in their ideological position. Also, people's general ideological positions (e.g., left/right position or support
for redistribution) originate in people's socio‐economic position. This reflection aside, it is of interest to see whether,
in case migrants' (economic) self‐interest fails to explain differences in welfare state attitudes, general economic
beliefs do. Migrants may be socialized, both in the country of origin and in their family with varying degrees of the role
of the government in the economy (Blekesaune, 2013; Habibov, 2013). Following this line of reasoning one would
anticipate that:H2: Differences between migrant groups and natives in support for government spending on welfare
schemes are explained by differences in ideology of economic individualism (a), with stronger support
for economic individualism being associated with less support for government spending (b).Another belief system that may play a major role in understanding differences between migrant groups is the role
of the family. Research has shown evidence that people with more conservative family values and more conservative
gender attitudes are less likely to support the government to take the role of provider (Van Oorschot, Reeskens, &
Meuleman, 2012). This is especially true for childcare provisions (Chung & Meuleman, 2017). On a more general level,
religious norms may drive these positions. Religions often prescribe more traditional family and gender norms. This
leads to the anticipation that:H3: Differences between migrant groups and natives in support for government spending on welfare
schemes are explained by differences in gender and family values (a), with a stronger support for con-
servative gender and family values being associated with less support for government spending (b).That being said, it is important to note, however, that familiaristic welfare policies—that support the family
as a care provider, such as financial compensations for stay‐at‐home‐mothers—(Esping‐Andersen, 1999; Leitner,
2003) are compatible with conservative family values. This is a competing expectation about the role of conser-
vative family values, and our test should provide evidence whether this association is a likely alternative to our
hypothesis.2.3 | Domains of government spending in the three residence countries
Government spending differences between domains of spending and between the three residence countries will also
reflect actual spending levels on these domains in the three countries (Koster & Kaminska, 2012). Chung and
Meuleman (2017) have shown that a country's actual childcare spending strongly affects public opinion on govern-
ment childcare spending, such that larger provision is associated with stronger support. This links to a broader litera-
ture, which anticipates a positive feedback effect between state responsibility and public opinion. The overall logic is
that once the state engages in different domains, the public expects continuation and expansion of these policies
(Pierson, 2000). Table 1 shows the available indicators about welfare generosity and health care indicators, revealing
some variance between the countries of residence. Overall, we find the most generous unemployment and social
assistance arrangements in Denmark, and the least generous arrangements in Germany; more generous (state) pen-
sion arrangements in the Netherlands than in both other residence countries, and cheaper and more generous
childcare arrangements in Denmark than in Germany, and in particular as compared to the Netherlands. These figures
are, however, averages, and there is quite some variation depending on the household situation and level of income
when applying for the benefit. As an example, the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD)
figures on childcare spending show that childcare fees in the Netherlands are among the highest in Europe, whereas
they are in the mid‐range in Germany and among the lowest in Denmark. However, families are compensated strongly
in the Netherlands for the cost of childcare, but this is means‐tested. In the Netherlands, the cost of childcare spend-
ing is unequally distributed among income groups, with a high absolute cost for the higher income categories. This, in
TABLE 1 Benefit generosity and policy‐domain related indicators in residence and origin countries

























cost as rate of
average waged
Residence countries:
Denmark 84 79 66 4.6 78.4 11.9
Germany 59 48 50 9.4 78.5 11.2
Netherlands 74 68 96 2.0 79.8 23.5
Origin countries:
Spain 78 32 90 6.7 75.6 5.6
United Kingdom 20 53 29 13.4 79.2 45.0
Poland 45 32 53 8.2 73.4 6.9
Romania 45 13 ‐ ‐ 71.2 ‐
Russia ‐ ‐ 81 ‐ 64.5 ‐
China ‐ ‐ 86 ‐ 74.6 ‐
Japan 69 62 40 19.4 80.5 21.7
Turkey 53 0 105 17.2 72.3 ‐
Philippines ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 65.3 ‐
United States 61 9 45 21.5 76.9 39.7
Source.
aOECD, Tax‐benefit models. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/benefits‐and‐wages.htm (accessed May 31,
2017).
bOECD, Pensions at a glance. Retrieved from http://oecd.stat (accessed February 17, 2017).
cWHO. Life expectancy at birth. Retrieved from http://apps.who.int/gho/indicatorregistry/App_Main/view_indicator.aspx?
iid=65 (accessed June 12, 2017).
dOECD, Tax‐benefit model 2014. Out‐of‐pocket childcare costs for a dual‐earner family: Full‐time care at a typical childcare
center, Chart PF3.4.B. Retrieved from http://oecd.stat (accessed February 17, 2017).
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children under the age of two, ranging from over 50% in the Netherlands, to 15% in Germany, to 0.6% in Denmark.
Overall, however, childcare arrangements are less generous in the Netherlands than in the other countries, and
following Chung and Meuleman (2017), this should be reflected in the welfare state attitudes, with more support
for generous policies in more generous states.
However, in the case of migrants, the expectations of government intervention in different areas can be shaped
both by the context in the country of residence and origin, and by the differences between these two contexts. The
article focuses on the latter. Since statistics from some of our studied origin countries (and from non‐
Western countries in general) are unavailable, we have too few cases to test in a sophisticated manner the hypothesis
that “the more generous the benefit in the country of origin as compared to the country of residence, the more likely
the migrant group will be to support government spending on the respective domain”. Table 1 provides some indica-
tions of the differences, though, which we relate to differences in attitudes between migrants and natives. In the rest
of the article, we first analyze to what extent migrant group differences are explained in terms of self‐interest and
ideology, and then study to what extent remaining (unexplained) differences are associated with the differences in
benefit generosity between origin country and residence country. Here we expect that better arrangements in the
900 LUBBERS ET AL.country of origin on a specific domain as compared to the country of residence are associated with stronger support
for government spending in that domain.3 | DATA AND MEASUREMENTS
We rely on a primary dataset from the MIFARE project that was funded by NORFACE (Bekhuis, Fage Hedegaard,
Siebel, Degen, & Renema, 2018). The dataset contains information about 10 migrant groups and natives who were
approached in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. In each country, first‐generation migrants from four EU
countries (Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and from five non‐EU countries (the United States, Rus-
sia, China, Japan, and Turkey) were sampled. Migrants from the Philippines were sampled in Denmark and the Neth-
erlands only. The objective was that 300 respondents from each origin country participated in each residence country,
as well as 300 natives. Migrants who were aged 16 or older at the time of migration were randomly sampled from the
municipality registers in the countries.1 The sample participants were sent an invitation letter and questionnaire both
in the host country language and country of origin language. Moreover, they could fill out the questionnaire in either
language online. Since we anticipated that response rates among non‐Western and Eastern European migrant groups
would be lower, a larger number of invitations (1,100) were sent out to migrants from Poland, Romania, Russia, China,
the Philippines, and Turkey, as compared to the other groups (900). Response rates varied between the migrant
groups and natives. Among natives, response rates were highest in Denmark and the Netherlands (up to 50%) and
lower in Germany (35%). Among the migrant groups, we found the highest response among Russian migrants in the
Netherlands (48%). In Germany, among all groups response rates were around 10 percentage points lower than in
the Netherlands and Denmark. The dataset contains 9,157 respondents (migrants and natives). In Denmark, we were
able to test the representativity of the sample to characteristics available in the national register, such as gender, age,
marital status, employment situation, and income. Although some group‐specific deviations were found, the sample
turned out to be representative for each migrant group. For the Netherlands, we were able to test on representativity
based on welfare benefit dependency by migrant group, and also here we found minor differences comparing the
sample to the population. Migrants' country of origin and country of destination are included as predictors of the gov-
ernment spending attitudes.3.1 | Attitudes to government spending
Respondents were asked about their attitudes on government spending on unemployment, social assistance, old age
state pensions, elderly care, health care, and childcare. They were asked whether the national government should
spend more or less, and it was made explicit that spending more might require an increase in taxation. The five answer
categories ranged from “much less” to “much more”, and a “don't know” answer category was given explicitly, which
was treated as missing in the analyses. The exact wording and answer categories are given in Appendix Table A1. The
correlations between the items range from 0.22 between spending on health care and spending on social assistance,
to 0.55 between spending on unemployment and spending on social assistance. Factor analyses of the scalability of
the items into one scale of government spending shows that there are, tested on all respondents, two underlying
dimensions. The first dimension relates to health care or universal government spending, combining the items on
health care, state pensions, childcare, and elderly care. The second dimension combined the preferences on spending
on unemployment and social assistance. However, this factor solution was unstable between the various migrant
groups in the different countries. Therefore, the items are analyzed separately.3.2 | Independent variables—Self‐interest indicators
To measure people's (economic) self‐interest, we rely on people's education, income, employment status, and labor
market contract. Moreover, we account for self‐interest with measures on benefit take up and health assessment.
LUBBERS ET AL. 9013.2.1 | Education
Based on ISCED2 categorization, the highest level of education was assigned based on the highest level attained in
either the country of origin or the country of residence. We distinguished between higher (upper secondary and
tertiary education) and lower educated respondents.
3.2.2 | Income
Respondents were asked to indicate their net household income (including benefits). Missing values were at 11.3%.
These were imputed by regression on educational level, employment situation, dependency on benefits, gender,
age, length of stay, children and partner in the household.
3.2.3 | Employment status
Respondents could indicate whether their main activity during an average week was “work”, “unemployed”, “study” or
other activities that were subsumed into “something else”. Respondents with work are taken as the reference
category.
3.2.4 | Labor market contract
We created five dummy variables. Respondents with a job could indicate whether they had a permanent contract (the
reference category), or whether they had a temporary contract. Self‐employed respondents were coded into a sepa-
rate category, just like respondents with a job but with no formal contract or a zero‐hours contract. People with no
work at all were coded into a separate category.
3.2.5 | Benefit take‐up
Respondents were asked whether they received a country of residence benefit from a social security scheme. We
coded whether respondents received: (i) an unemployment benefit; (ii) a social assistance benefit; (iii) a disability
benefit; (iv) a state pension; and (v) child care support.
3.2.6 | Health assessment
Respondents were asked to assess their health with the question, “How is your health in general?”. The answers to this
subjective health assessment were coded such that respondents with bad health (very bad, bad or fair) were
contrasted to respondents with good health (good or very good).3.3 | Independent variables—Ideological positions
To capture economic individualism, respondents were asked to state to what extent they agree with two questions
about what the government might do for the economy, “cuts in government spending” and “more government regu-
lation of business” (see Appendix Table A1). The questions are similar to International Social Survey Programme word-
ing, and respondents were offered a “can't choose” category. The correlation between the two items was, however,
almost zero, and we therefore included both “Favoring cuts in government spending” and “Opposing more regulation”.
In order not to lose the “can't choose” respondents, we compare respondents (strongly) favoring government cuts and
respondents (strongly) opposing more regulation to all others.
Conservative family values were captured with a measure on gender roles and on support for gay marriage,
respectively. Respondents were asked to indicate their agreement with the conservative statements, “A man's job
is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family”, and the progressive formulation that,
“Homosexuals should be free to get married if they want to”. Given the relatively low associations (r = −.41), we
decided here as well to include both indicators separately. Both items were recoded such that on both items
conservative respondents are compared to all others.
902 LUBBERS ET AL.Respondents were also asked who should be primarily responsible for childcare for working parents, and care in
everyday life for elderly people who cannot take care of themselves. They could choose between the answer catego-
ries “family members or friends”, “people that live nearby (neighbours)”, “government agencies”, “non‐profit organiza-
tions”, “private providers that are paid for” and a “can't choose” option was given. Respondents mentioning “the family
or friends” on one of the items were coded into evaluating the “family as primarily responsible in providing care”.
Lastly, we accounted for religious identification of the respondent. Respondents could indicate on a 4‐point scale
whether they consider themselves as not religious at all (1) to very religious (4).
We control for gender, having children in the household, having a partner, and age of the respondent. Moreover,
we control for length of stay in the country (which equals, for natives, their age), for proficiency in the country of
destination's language, and for the mode in which the questionnaire was filled out (written or online). Missing values
were limited, not exceeding the 1% within each of the migrant groups by country of residence. The exception is, how-
ever, the dependent variable, where a relatively large group chose the given answer category “don't know”, which
were excluded from the analysis. We exclude missing values listwise, leaving us with 8,482 respondents for the
multivariate analyses.4 | FINDINGS
The migrant groups in our sample turn out to vary socio‐economically as we anticipated, ensuring variance in the
socio‐economic position between the migrant groups. Based on their household income, we find for all three
countries that the socio‐economic position among migrants from Poland and Turkey is relatively worse, compared
to natives and the other migrants included in the survey. Migrants from China, the Philippines, Russia, and Romania
also have a (somewhat) lower household income than natives. The Spanish migrants are in a comparable position to
natives, while Japanese, British, and American migrants earn more.
Turning to support for government spending among the migrant groups and natives, in Figure 1 we provide the
average per migrant group for each of the welfare state domains that were evaluated. Figure 1 makes it clear that
differences between natives and specific migrant groups exist, that there are differences between countries of
residence, and that differences in support for government spending are also dependent on the specific domain of
spending. For the income schemes provided by the state, unemployment benefits, social assistance, and state
pensions, native Danes, Germans, and Dutch take a middle position compared to the various migrant groups.
Migrants from Turkey stand out here, in that they give more support to government spending on unemployment,
social assistance, and state pensions than other migrant groups in the three countries. Spanish and Polish migrants
are also more likely to support government spending, but their attitudes vary somewhat between domains and
residence countries. On the other hand, migrants from Japan and China are generally somewhat less likely to support
government spending.
Natives stand out in their preference for additional government spending on elderly care. Native Danish, German,
and Dutch respondents support spending on elderly care more strongly than any of the migrant groups in each of the
countries. Also in the domain of health care, natives show relatively strong support for additional spending, with
Turkish and Spanish migrants scoring about equal to natives or higher. In Germany, natives are more supportive of
additional spending on childcare than migrants from all origins. But the opposite is found for the Netherlands, where
respondents show the least support of all groups for government spending on childcare. Migrants in the Netherlands
show much larger support for spending on childcare, but less so than all migrant groups in Germany. Figure 1 clearly
provides evidence for migrant group variance, country of residence variance, and government spending domain
variance. In our modelling, we investigate whether this variance in spending preferences is explained by the differ-
ences in self‐interest and ideological positions.
We present the results of multivariate multilevel models predicting support for each of the welfare state spending
domains to scrutinize to what extent the differences between migrant groups and natives (model 1) remain after
FIGURE 1 Support for “Government spending” (1 = “much less” to 5 = “much more”) among natives and migrant
groups in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands
Note. Migrants from the Philippines not included in Germany.
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TABLE 2 Multivariate regression parameters to explain attitudes on government spending in the domains of unem-
ployment, social assistance, and state pension (n = 8,482)





















‐ Americans .05 .13** .08 .29** .37** .31** .04 .11* .08
‐ British .09* .15* .08 .39** .46** .39** .16** .20** .16**
‐ Spaniards .36** .38** .29** .47** .50** .40** .31** .34** .29**
‐ Poles .16** .10 .04 .28** .21** .13** .38** .35** .31**
‐ Romanians .13** .12* .09 .04 .01 −.04 .15** .15** .12**
‐ Turks .40** .32** .26** .44** .32** .23** .31** .27** .24**
‐ Russians −.07 −.11* −.09 .10 .04 .05 .15** .15** .16**
‐ Chinese −.13* −.11* −.12* .04 .01 −.01 .11* .14** .12**
‐ Filipino −.04 −.06 −.05 .11** .07 .04 .27** .26** .26**
‐ Japanese −.13* −.10* −.11* −.01 .02 −.00 .02 .04 .04
Country of residence
‐ Germany (ref)
‐ Denmark −.11** −.09** −.10** −.05 .01 .01 −.25** −.21** −.21**
‐ The Netherlands −.05* −.05 −.04 .29** .28** .30** −.14** −.13** −.12**
Self‐interest indicators
Level of education: higher −.06** −.05** −.00 .01 −.08** −.08**
Income −.03** −.02** −.05** −.05** −.02** −.02**
Employment situation
‐ Employed (ref)
‐ Unemployed .15** .16** .20** .20** .05 .05
‐ Not employed: study .02 .03 .08 .09 −.02 −.01
‐ Not employed: other .03 .03 .01 .02 .01 .03
Labor market contract
‐ Permanent (ref)
‐ Self‐employed −.06 −.04 .01 .03 −.01 .00
‐ Fixed term .07* .06* .18** .16** .04 .03
‐ No formal contract/zero hour .10 .10 .10 .10 −.01 −.01
‐ No work .02 .01 .07 .05 −.03 −.03
Benefit take‐up
Unemployment benefit .25** .25**
Social assistance benefit .14** .13**
State pension benefit .01 .01
Child allowance
Bad health .15** .14** .15** .14** .09** .08**
Ideological positions
Favoring cuts in government −.19** −.22** −.05**
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Conservative family values −.06 −.10** −.04
Family responsibility −.10** −.05 −.05*
Importance of religion .01 .04** .00
Controlsa
Gender: female .03* .02 −.01 .03* .02 −.01 .03* .02 −.01
Child in the household −.03* −.01 −.01 −.03* −.01 −.01 −.03* −.01 −.01
Having a partner .04* .01 .01 .04* .01 .01 .04* .01 .01
Age −.002* −.003* −.002* −.002* −.003* −.002* .005** .004** .004**
Length of stay .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004**
Residence country language
proficiency
.01 −.01 −.01 .01 −.01 −.01 .01 −.01 −.01
Mode: written questionnaire
(ref = online)
.04** .03* .02 .04** .03* .02 .04** .03* .02
Intercept 2.84 3.03 3.15 2.60 2.90 2.97 3.09 3.31 3.38
Proportion explained variance 4.3 7.7 10.6 5.5 10.0 13.1 5.5 6.8 8.0
Notes.
**p < .01 *p < .05.
aControls are estimated as common coefficients in the multivariate models. Except for age which is tested as common coef-
ficient for the domains of “state pensions” and “elderly care” and a separate common factor for the other domains. “Child in
the household” is tested as a separate coefficient for the domain of childcare only.
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Responses to the preferences of the six welfare domains are nested within individuals, accounting for the within‐
respondent response pattern. We estimate OLS regression coefficients within Mlwin. A robustness check was con-
ducted in which we contrasted respondents who favor more spending to the other respondents, performing logistic
regression analyses, which did not lead to other conclusions. Since we are interested in the remaining differences
in welfare state spending preferences between migrant groups, and natives, we favor the simpler regression models
above the logistic regression models.
InTables 2 and 3, model 1 shows that for all the domains, significant migrant group differences exist after includ-
ing control variables. The pattern is comparable to the Figure 1 discussion.3 After the inclusion of the self‐interest
explanations, in model 2, the differences largely remain. This implies that the included self‐interest characteristics can-
not account for the migrant group differences in support for additional government spending. Even though we find
support for the general expectations from the self‐interest approach, namely that a higher socio‐economic position
is generally associated with less support for additional government spending (mainly in the income related
government spending schemes), it does not explain the differences between the migrant groups, or between
Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. Mediation (in terms of reduction of the differences between migrant groups
and natives) only takes place between Turkish migrants and natives, but hardly at all when comparing the other
migrants to natives.
In model 3, we include ideological attitudes to explain government spending preferences. Overall, the found
effects are as expected: support for cuts in government spending and opposing business regulations are associated
with less government spending on all of the domains. A conservative gender role attitude is associated with less
government spending preference on elderly care and on childcare. Conservative family values, measured as opposi-
tion to gay marriage, are associated with less government spending preferences on social assistance, elderly care,
TABLE 3 Multivariate regression parameters to explain attitudes on government spending in the domains of elderly
care, health care and childcare (n = 8,482)
Elderly care Health care Childcare
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Ethnic groups
‐ Natives (ref)
‐ Americans −.25** −.21** −.24** −.06 −.01 −.04 .22** .20** .17**
‐ British −.13* −.11* −.15** .02 .05 .01 .24** .24** .18**
‐ Spaniards −.07 −.04 −.10 .17** .22** .16** .41** .40** .32**
‐ Poles −.22** −.24** −.25** −.01 .00 −.01 .46** .45** .45**
‐ Romanians −.20** −.19** −.20** −.09 −.07 −.08 .50** .50** .51**
‐ Turks −.15** −.15** −.16** .31** .31** .30** .47** .49** .49**
‐ Russians −.31** −.30** −.26** −.07 −.05 −.03 .42** .41** .45**
‐ Chinese −.29** −.26** −.25** −.14** −.10* −.12** .29** .28** .29**
‐ Filipino −.07 −.06 −.04 .04 .08 .09 .17** .16** .23**
‐ Japanese −.30** −.28** −.29** −.15** −.13** −.14** .24** .24** .23**
Country of residence
‐ Germany (ref)
‐ Denmark −.18** −.16** −.17** .10** .11** .10** −.33** −.35** −.38**
‐ The Netherlands −.10** −.13** −.08** .08** .10** .10** −.41** −.42** −.41**
Self‐interest indicators
Level of education: higher −.08** −.08** −.08** −.08** .01 .00
Income −.00 −.00 .00 .01 .00 .00
Employment situation
‐ Employed (ref)
‐ Unemployed −.02 −.01 .02 .03 −.04 −.02
‐ Not employed: study .02 .03 .12** .13** .04 .05
‐ Not employed: other .01 .03 .05 .06 .01 .02
Labor market contract
‐ Permanent (ref)
‐ Self‐employed −.00 .01 .05 .06 .02 .03
‐ Fixed term .02 .02 −.01 −.02 .09** .08**
‐ No formal contract/
zero hour
.02 .03 .07 .01 .07 .09
‐ No work −.03 −.04 −.06 −.07 −.00 .01
Benefit take‐up
Disability benefit .03 .03
State pension benefit .01 .01
Child allowance .16** .15**
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Elderly care Health care Childcare




Conservative family values −.11** −.09** −.07*
Family responsibility −.10** −.04 −.16**
Importance of religion .02 −.00 −.02
Controlsa
Gender: female .03* .02 −.01 .03* .02 −.01 .03* .02 .02
Child in the household −.03* −.01 −.01 −.03* −.01 −.01 .14** .10** .10**
Having a partner .04* .01 .01 .04* .01 .01 .04* .01 .01
Age .005** .004** .004** −.002* −.003* −.002* −.002* −.003* −.003*
Length of stay .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004** .004**
Residence country language
proficiency
.01 −.01 −.01 .01 −.01 −.01 .01 −.01 −.01
Mode: written questionnaire
(ref = online)
.04** .03* .02 .04** .03* .02 .04** .03* .03*
Intercept 3.54 3.65 3.28 3.49 3.49 3.58 3.23 3.27 3.45
Proportion explained
variance
7.1 7.5 8.9 3.3 4.1 5.2 6.6 7.3 9.6
Notes.
**p < .01; *p < .05.
aControls are estimated as common coefficients in the multivariate models. Except for age which is tested as common coef-
ficient for the domains of “state pensions” and “elderly care” and a separate common factor for the other domains. “Child in
the household” is tested as a separate coefficient for the domain of childcare only.
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and children prefer less government spending on unemployment, state pensions, elderly care, and childcare. Religious
self‐identification has hardly an effect beyond these attitudinal measures. However, our crucial test was whether
differences between migrant groups would be reduced after including these ideological positions. This is hardly the
case. Only for Spanish and Turkish respondents are their higher levels of preference for government spending partly
explained by the inclusion of the ideological differences between the groups.
Controlling for both self‐interest explanations and ideological positions, we find that migrants from Russia, China,
and Japan are in general less in favor of more spending than natives, whereas migrants from Spain and Turkey are
more in favor of additional spending than natives. Moreover, we find that migrants remain less likely to prefer more
spending on elderly care, but prefer more spending on childcare.
A comparison of self‐interest and ideology effects shows that income and being unemployed only affect spending
in the income‐related domains (unemployment benefit, social assistance, and state pensions), whereas education is
related to domains of health care and elderly care as well. People who perceive their health to be in a worse condition
are more likely to support government spending in all domains. General ideologies on the role of the government are
related foremost to spending on the income schemes, whereas gender and family values are mainly associated with
spending on health care, elderly care, and childcare.
A final expectation we formulated is that differences in domain‐specific provisions between the country of
origin and residence may be associated with differences in attitudes between migrants and natives on government
spending on that domain. As we have shown, a large part of the variance between migrant groups and natives in







FIGURE 2 Association between ratio of country of origin and country of destination welfare support and the
remaining difference between migrant group and natives in preferences for social spending after accounting for
interest and ideology [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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LUBBERS ET AL. 909differences in attitudes between migrants and natives in the government spending attitudes (in each of the resi-
dence countries: Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands) are related to differences between country of origin
and country of residence in generosity of provisions and relevant indicators on poverty and life expectancy. These
figures are given as a first exploration of a possible association, since there are too few countries included here to
formally test the relationship. Figure 2a presents the association between the ratio of the origin and residence
country's initial unemployment net replacement rate and the remaining difference we found in the attitude
towards government spending on unemployment. There is a small positive association, meaning that when in
the country of origin the initial unemployment replacement rate is higher than in the residence country (x‐axis
values over 1), the migrant group in the residence country is more supportive of additional spending in the domain
of unemployment as compared to the native population. This finding is in line with the general idea that migrants
apply their country of origin experience to the situation in the country of residence. It therefore holds that
migrant groups from an origin where the initial unemployment replacement rate was lower than in the residence
country are less in favor of additional government spending. However, given that the projected slope in the figure
is not very steep, the association is weak. For the attitude on spending on social assistance we find an opposite
effect as that in the domain of unemployment. Here we find a slight negative slope (Figure 2b): for migrant groups
where in the country of origin the generosity for social assistance is weaker than in the country of residence, we
find that they are more supportive of additional government spending on social assistance than natives. There is a
small positive association between the ratio in net pension replacement rates and the extent to which migrant
groups differ from natives in their support for government spending on state pensions (Figure 2c): migrants from
origin countries with better net pension replacement rates than the destination country are more in favor of
spending more on pensions.
The figure on elderly care (Figure 2d) shows that if the old age poverty rate is higher in the country of origin
than in the country of residence, migrants tend to be less favorable of government spending on elderly care than
natives. We find no association between the health care indicator of life expectancy and support for government
spending on health care (Figure 2e). Lastly, we find that migrant groups who are faced with higher childcare costs
in the country of origin than in the country of residence are less supportive of government spending on childcare
than natives (Figure 2f).5 | CONCLUSIONS
The two dominant explanations of welfare state attitudes among the majority population refer to self‐interest and ide-
ology. Our analyses of the MIFARE survey data collected among 10 migrant groups and natives in Denmark, Germany,
and the Netherlands show that these explanations are also of relevance among migrants. However, these key expla-
nations in the welfare state literature were unable to explain the large differences we found between migrant groups
and natives in government spending attitudes. Migrants from China and Japan, and to a smaller extent from Russia
and the United States, are less favorable of additional government spending than natives. On the other hand, we
found evidence that migrants from Turkey and Spain, and to a lesser extent from Poland, were more in favor of
government spending. Only a small part of the differences between migrant groups were explained by differences
in self‐interest (e.g., the on average better economic position of US migrants explained their lower support for govern-
ment spending, and the generally worse‐off economic position of Turks explained partly their higher support) and
ideological positions (e.g., the lower support among Turks for economic individualism explained part of their stronger
preference of government spending, whereas the less conservative family values among Spanish migrants partly
explained their stronger support). Although economic individualism and conservative family values may be measured
more adequately in future research, we think that we captured some of the key aspects of these ideologies. We have
to conclude that major differences remained between migrant groups as well as between natives and migrant groups,
also after controlling for self‐interest and ideology.
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we explored differences in state provisions between the country of origin and the country of residence. For four
welfare policy domains we found, indeed, that a less generous arrangement in the country of origin as compared to
the country of residence was associated with less support for government spending on that domain in the country
of residence. This finding implies that for migrant groups, a country of origin versus country of residence comparison
is relevant where they have a preference for more spending, in particular when in their country of origin generosity on
the domain was higher. This is in line with the finding from Chung and Meuleman (2017), who showed that people
have stronger support for generous policies in countries where these policies are already more generous. However,
the associations we found were weak. Moreover, for the domain of social assistance, we found a reversed association.
Given the limited number of residence countries, as well as origin countries with comparable figures, we were not able
to strictly test these associations, and a more formal test of the association would be necessary. Moreover, net
replacement rates regarding unemployment benefits, social assistance, and pensions as well as costs for childcare
are highly dependent on the household composition and average wage before relying on the benefit—refinements
that should be addressed in future research.
The Netherlands stood out in terms of support for additional spending on childcare. All migrant groups support
additional spending on this domain more strongly than the Dutch do, whereas this was not found in Denmark and
Germany. The Dutch government does not spend less on childcare as percentage of gross domestic product, but its
fees are highly income‐dependent, rendering childcare relatively expensive for high earners. More differences
between countries of residence were found as well. All three countries score relatively well on their integration pol-
icies, but there are also marked differences between the countries. The Migrant Policy Index (MIPEX, 2017) evaluates
access to social security to be most favorable in Germany and the Netherlands, and less so in Denmark, which has the
most restrictions and reductions for immigrants since 2014. Migrants have access to old‐age pension in Denmark only
after having lived in the country for 10 years, and they risk losing residence permits for their family if they receive
certain benefits (MIPEX, 2017). An interesting hypothesis to be tested further is that in countries that are more
restrictive in granting migrants access to the welfare state, migrants will profit less from additional government spend-
ing. If these more restrictive conditions apply, we would expect migrants to be less likely to support additional gov-
ernment spending, and that their self‐interest structure would not be as relevant in their support for the welfare
state. Since we studied migrants in three receiving countries only, we were not able to make a strong empirical test
of this hypothesis. It is, however, a hypothesis that deserves testing in future research.
The study shows that most previous research heaping together all migrants in one catch‐all category, or focusing
only on non‐Western migrants missed a careful interpretation of the role of migrant status. Being a migrant cannot be
equated to a less favorable socio‐economic status and therefore stronger support for welfare state spending. Our
analyses make clear that accounting for different migrant groups remains relevant to understand why migrants
support welfare state spending. Our exploration of socialization and dominant welfare provision modes in the country
of origin are promising explanations to further understand migrant group differences.
Our findings have important implications for current policy debates as they strongly challenge the oft‐held
assumption that generous welfare states work like a magnet and attract migrants who hope to benefit from social
policies. Rather, our results show great variation in welfare state support among migrants, and point out that some
migrant groups expect less from the welfare state than natives do.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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ENDNOTES
1 It was not possible in Germany to sample on this criterion. Migrants who had been in Germany before the age of 16 were
dropped from the data we analyzed here.
2 International Standard Classification of Education.
3 We also estimated interaction models in which country of origin dummies were interacted with country of destination
dummies. Many of these interactions turned out to be significant, implying that the differences in spending preferences
between migrant groups and natives in Germany (reference) vary from the differences between migrant groups and natives
in the other countries. Our results show that there are country of origin effects, country of destination effects, and
community effects (country of origin x country of destination).
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LUBBERS ET AL. 913APPENDIXTABLE A1 Questionnaire wording of attitude measures
Attitude Original wording in questionnaire Original answer categories
Attitudes to government spending Listed below are again various areas
of government spending in the
[host country]. Please show, by
ticking one box for each area,
whether you would like to
see more or less government
spending.
Remember that if you say “much
more”, it might require a tax
increase to pay for it.
1. Spend much more
2. Spend more
3. Spend the same as now
4. Spend less
5. Spend much less
6. Can't choose
Economic individualism: in favor
of cuts of government spending
Here are two things the government
might do for the economy. Please
indicate whether you are in favor
of or against the following actions?
Cuts in government spending
1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of




Economic individualism: in favor




1. Strongly in favor of
2. In favor of




Conservative gender attitudes And do you agree or disagree with
the following statements?
A man's job is to earn money;
a woman's job is to look after
the home and family
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
Conservative family values Homosexuals should be free to
get married if they want to
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
Family responsibility People also have different views on
who should be primarily responsible
for childcare for working parents
and care in everyday life for elderly
people who cannot take care of
themselves. Who do you think
should primarily provide help to…
1. Family members or friends
2. People that live nearby (neighbors)
3. Government agencies
4. Non‐profit organizations
5. Private providers that are paid for
6. Can't choose
